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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
POINT I 
IDAHO LAW IS APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES IN 
THIS CASE. 
POINT II 
UNDER IDAHO LAW DEFENDANT CLEARLY HAS 
THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD WITH THE EVI-
DENCE AND PROVING ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF A 
GIFT, EXCEPTING IRREVOCABLE DELIVERY, BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
POINT III 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CLEARLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV 
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE SUPREME COURT TO RE-
VIEW THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO THE FINDINGS, AND THEY l\'IUST BE ALLOWED TO 
STAND IF REASONABLE MINDS COULD AGREE WITH 
THEM. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiffs and defendant are all of the heirs 
at law of one James Leon \Voodward, deceased. Dur-
ing the lifetirne of James Leon \Voodward, he plac:::d 
defendant-appellant Bessie lVIonson on a joint bank 
account with him which he maintained in the First 
Security Bank in Preston, Idaho. Following the death 
of Jam es Leon Woodward, Bessie Monson, defen-
dant-appellant, withdrevv the funds and claimed 
them as her own. This is an action brought by plain-
tiffs against defendant by which they seek to re-
cover their fair distributive share of the said joint 
bank account. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This action was commenced in the District 
Court of Weber County. On January 15, 1969 it was 
tried be:fo1·e the Honorable John F. \Vahlquist, sit-
ting without a jury. Judgment was rendered in favoi· 
of Jam es Orville Woodward against defendant Bessie 
Monson in the sum of $2,599.93, judgment was ren-
dered in favor of Glen Woodward and against dE:-
fendant Bessie Monson in the sum of $1,335.93, 
judgment was rendered in favor of Thelma Dalton 
and against defendant Bessie Monson in the sum of 
$1,335.93, and judgment was rendered in favor of 
Joyce Dickason against defendant Bessie I\1onson 
in the sum of $1,335.93. Plaintiffs were also award-
ed costs in the amount of $18.20. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents are not entirely in agreement with 
appellant's statement of facts, and therefore re-state 
facts pertinent to the issues before the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah on appeal. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following facts do not appear to be in dis-
pute, inasmuch as they are stated in appellant's 
statement of facts: Plaintiffs-respondents and de-
fendant-appellant are the sole surviving children of 
Jam es Leon W cod ward, who died a single man, and 
intestate, on August 31, 1964. Prior to his death, 
Jam es Leon Woodward owned a farm in the State 
of Idaho near Preston, Idaho. James Leon Wood-
ward maintained his personal savings account in the 
First Security Bank of Preston, Idaho. During the 
summer of 1963 he went to Ogden, Utah, and had 
defendant-appellant Bessie Monson, sign a form re-
quired by the bank for creating a joint bank account 
in the names of James Leon \Voodward and Bessie 
Menson. Funds in the bank account represented pri-
marily if not entirely proceeds from the sale of farm 
land previously owned by Jam es Leon Woodward. 
At the time of the death of James Leon Wood-
ward funds in the amount of $12,500.00 were on de-
posit in the First Security Bank of Preston, Idaho. 
Following the death of James Leon Woodward, de-
fendant-appellant Bessie Monson transferred the 
funds from the First Security Bank of Preston, 
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Idaho to the Bank of Ben Lomond in Ogden, Utah 
in an account she had set up in her own name. From 
these funds she paid certain expenses of last illness 
and burial of James Leon Woodward. She paid the 
sum of $1,000.00 to her mother, Safrona Woodward, 
the divorced wife of James Leon Woodward, and 
paid the additional sum of $1,000.00 to each of the 
plaintiffs-respondents, with the exception of James 
Orville Woodward. She did not pay any sums what-
soever to James Orville Woodward. 
DISPUTED FACTS 
The following facts are either in dispute, or 
were not mentioned in appellant's statement of facts: 
During his lifetime, James Leon Woodward lived 
on a farm owned by him in Idaho neai· Preston, 
Idaho, approximately nine months out of the year. 
The farm consisted of about 100 acres ( T-51). He 
spent approximately three months, the winter 
months, in Ogden, Utah, in a rented apartment. He 
came to Ogden, Utah on weekends during the spring, 
summer and fall months, from time to time. (T-12, 
T-14, T-15, T-67). 
James Leon Woodward sold a portion of his 
farm, and placed the proceeds resulting therefrom 
in a bank account in the First Security Bank in 
Preston, Idaho ( T-55, T-56). 
During the summer of 1963 James Leon Wood-
ward told defendant Bessie Monson that he had a 
card for her to sign. He said, "I want you to sign 
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this so if anything happens to me you can take care 
of my burial and draw the money out and take care 
of my burial." ( T-56, T-57) He gave defendant-ap-
pellant Bessie Monson no further instructions and 
' said nothing further to her about the account. (T-56, 
T-57) This was the only conversation defendant-
appellant Bessie Monson ever had with her father 
concerning the joint account. ( T-7 4) 
Jam es Leon Woodward did not deliver posses-
sion of the pass book to Bessie Monson during his 
lifetime. ( T-58, 'f-68) During the lifetime of Jam es 
Leon Woodward, defendant-appellant Bessie Mon-
son made no withdrawals from the joint account. 
( T-69) She had no intention of making any with-
d1·a wal from the account during his lifetime. (T-69) 
She made no deposits to the account during the life-
time of James Leon vv oodward. During the lifetime 
of Jam es Leon \Voodward Bessie Monson did not 
feel th2.t the account, or the funds contained therein, 
belonged to her at all. ( T-69) James Leon Woodward 
never told defendant-appellant Bessie Monson that 
he gave her the account or the money in it. ( T-69) 
Bessie Monson did not feel that the funds in the bank 
account belonged to her until after the death of 
James Leon Woodward. (T-75) 
Just prior to his confinement in the hospital 
during his last illness, Jam es Leon Woodward spent 
several days with Bessie Monson at her home in 
Ogden, Utah. (T-64) He was admitted to the hos-
pital on August 29, 1964 and died on August 31, 
1964. (T-64) He was admitted on Friday, and died 
the following Sunday. (T-64) 
Thelma Dalton one of the plaintiffs-respondents 
herein was not fully advised of the seriousness of the 
last confinement. On Sunday, her mother notified 
her that her brother Glen Dalton and his wife had 
gone to Ogden, and that James Jeon Woodward was 
in the hospital. ( T-84) James Orville Woodward 
was not notified of his fa the rs last illness until after 
his father had passed away. (T-137) By that time 
his father's body had already been removed to Pres-
ton, Idaho. (T-137) Due to the entire set of circum-
stances surrounding the death of his father and the 
lack of notification, James Orville Woodward be-
came too sick and nervous to go to the funeral. ( T-
138, T-139) Thelma Dalton was unable to attend 
the funeral due to car trouble. ( T-84) 
James Orville Woodward lived with his father 
for two winters in Ogden prior to the time his father 
died. On one occasion he lived with his father during 
the winter months in Ogden about four years before 
he died, and Oil another occasion he spent the winter 
months with him about two years before the death 
of James Leon Woodward, his father. ( T-135) 
Prior to his death, James Leon Woodward had 
told Thelma Dalton that he had money for her. 
(T-86) 
Following the death of James Leon Woodward 
defendant-appellant Bessie Monson went to the home 
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and residence of Jam es Leon Woodward in Idaho, 
and removed all of the papers nad documents pertain-
ing to the sale of the farm property by James Leon 
vVoodward and the bank account. ( T-129) 
Following removal of these documents and 
papers from the farmhouse, her brothers and sisters, 
plaintiffs-respondents herein, inquired of Bessie 
Monson defendant-appellant, what had become of the 
farm. They inquired of Bessie Monson about funds 
which they felt their father would have had if the 
farm had been sold. Although Bessie Monson had the 
papers relating to the sale of the farm and surround-
ing the transaction in her possession at that time, she 
told her brothers and sisters that she didn't know 
anything about it. (T-131) 
Defendant-appellant Bessie Monson admitted 
during the course of the trial that her brother Glen 
Woodward, one of the plaintiffs-respondents herein, 
asked her about the farm, whether it had been sold, 
where the proceeds of the farm went, and that she 
told him she didn't know at a time when she very 
well knew. She admitted that her answer to her 
brother was not entirely truthful. (T-70) She fur-
ther admitted that she told her sister, Thelma Dal-
on, one of the plaintiffs-respondents herein, that she 
didn't know where the proceeds from the sale of the 
farm were at a time when she well knew where the 
proceeds were, and further admitted that her state-
ments to her sister Thelma Dalton were not entirely 
truthful. (T-70) 
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Following the f une1·al Bessie Monson told her 
brother Glen Woodward that she did not know what 
had happened to the proceeds from the sale of their 
father's farm. (T-111, T-109) 
On the Tuesday following the funeral, Thelma 
Dalton went to visit her father's grave, and upon 
returning stopped at the residence of Bessie Monson 
in Ogden, Utah. (T-85) Mrs. Dalton inquired of 
Bessie Monson where her father's money was, and 
explained that a year earlier Jam es Leon Woodward 
had promised Thelma Dalton that there was money 
available for her. (T-86) Bessie Monson said there 
wasn't going to be any money left. ( T-86) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IDAHO LAW IS APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES IN 
THIS CASE. 
It is conceded in this case that the questioned 
bank account was maintained in the First Security 
Bank of Preston, Idaho in Preston, Idaho. The de-
ceased James Leon Woodward maintained a 100-
acre farm in Idaho, near Preston, Idaho, for some 
years. In his later years a portion of it was sold, 
and he maintained a smaller farm together with a 
home in Idaho near Preston, Idaho. He spent ap-
proximately nine months out of the year in Idaho 
on his farm property. He maintained his personal 
affects and papers at his farmhouse in Idaho. 
In 10 Am. Jur. 2d, Banks § 376 ( 1963) it is 
stated: 
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"It seems to be agreed that title to and 
rights in a bank deposit standing in the names 
of the depositor "and" another or the deposit-
or "or" another is govErnecl by the law of the 
place where the deposit has been made and 
the account is kept.'1 This general rule has 
been applied to deposits in the names of 
spouses, both in cases in which the spouses 
were, and in those in which they were not, 
residents of the state in which the deposit 
was made. 1 
Where persons in a foreign country vol-
untarily transferred money to a New York 
bank for deposit in a joint and survivorship 
account, the account was upheld under the 
New York law as such, even though it would 
have been invalid under the foreign law. 5 " 
The law of the jurisdiction where a banK account is 
maintained is controlling. 
Appellant argues that Utah substantive law 
should have been controlling in this case upon the 
theory that when Bessie Monson signed a bank sig-
nature card in Utah, the last act had been performed 
which created a three-party contract and set up a 
joint bank account in the First Security Bank in 
Preston, Idaho. Query, if the signature card had 
never been delivered to the First Security Bank in 
Preston, Idaho, would a joint account have been 
created? Obviously not. The last acts necessary for 
the completion of the contract, even under defend-
ant's theory, would have been the delivery of the 
bank signature card, duly executed, to the First Se-
curity Bank at Preston, Idaho, together with the 
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acceptance thereof by the bank and the setting up 
of the account. 
Appellant relies heavily on Buhler vs. Maddison, 
166 P.2d 205 (1946) in his brief, and cites a por-
tion of the opinion. Following the decision ref erred 
to by appellant, the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah granted a re-hearing of the case. As stated in 
the subsequent decision found at 109 Ut. 267, 176 
P.2d 118 ( 194 7) the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah stated: 
"We granted a re-hearing and have re-
examined the record and reconsidered the en-
tire case." 
The Buhler vs. Maddison case involved a work-
man's compensation claim. An injury occurred in 
the State of Nevada, but as defendants resided in 
the State of Utah, action was brought in the State 
of Utah based upon the Nevada Workman's Com-
pensation Act. The Court held that defendants were 
nonaccepting employers under the Nevada Compen-
sation Act. 
The Nevada Compensation Act had a provi-
sion in it which stated as follows: 
" ( 4) In actions by an employee against an 
employer for personal injuries sustained, aris-
ing out of and in the course of the employ-
ment where the employer has rejected the 
provisions of this act, it shall be presumed 
that the injury to the employee was the first 
result, and growing out of the negligence of 
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the employer, and that such negligence was 
the prm:imate cause of the injury; and in 
such case the burden of proof shall rest upon 
the employer to rebut the presumption of 
negligence." Para. 2680, Sec. 1 (b), Nevada 
Comp. L. 1931-41. 
The Utah Supreme Court was confronted with the 
question as to the effect and operation of the presump-
tion of negligence and proxiniate cause established 
by the Nevada Act. Defendant argued that such 
pr€Sumption shifts only the burden of going forward 
with the proof, and th2t once the employer has pro-
duced evidence to rebut the presumption of negli-
gence, the presumption is sp2nt, and it drops out of 
the picture. Plaintiffs argued that the presumption 
sh if ts the burden of convincing th2 judge or jury on 
the issue of negligsnce and prcximate cause, often 
called the Burden of Pursuasion, and that instead 
of such burden being upon the plaintiff as it usu-
ally is, defendant had tl1e burden, and that upon 
proof of the employer employee relationship, of the 
injury ai·ising out of and in the usual course of em-
ployment, and that the employer had not accepted 
the act relative to insurance, that plaintiff is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law unless the defend-
ant shall produce evidence that the defendant was 
not negligent; that in determining such question, 
the presumption of negligence of the defendant re-
mains as an element to be weighed with the other 
evidence by the trier of fact. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the Buhler vs. Mad-
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dison case was concerned over whether or not the 
presumption of negligence and proximate cause in-
volved in the action were matters of substance, a 
part of the cause of action, or were they merely 
matters of procedure. If they were matters of sub-
stance, the Nevada law would clearly control. If 
they were matters of procedure only, the law of the 
State of Utah would control. The Court stated: 
"In determining whether an element of 
the cause of action is a matter of substance 
or a procedure, the Court will examine the 
statute or rule of law creating the claim, right 
or duty, and the interpretations thereof by 
the Courts of the state creating the right, or 
where the ca use of action arose. If the re-
quirement concerning proof of an element of a 
cause of action exists in the lex loci, and if 
such requirement is there interpreted as a 
condition of the cause of action itself, the 
Court of the forum would apply the rule of 
the foreign state. This is so because "the rem-
edial and substantive portions of the foreign 
law are so bound together that the applica-
tion of the usual procedural rules of the forum 
would seriously alter the effect of the opera-
tive facts under the law of the foreign state." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah held: 
"It must follow therefor that the statu-
tory presumption of negligence and proximate 
cause are so closely allied and interwoven with 
the cause of action itself that it cannot be sep-
arated therefrom without seriously impairing 
the integrity of the cause of action. The law 
of Nevada, lex loci, and not the law of Utah, 
12 
lex fori must govern on the question as to 
whether the jury could_ consider and weigh 
the presumptwn of negligence along with the 
other evidence on the question of defendants 
negligence and proximate cause. The trial 
Court applied the Nevada rule which was the 
correct procedure." 
The Supreme Court stated to the extent that 
their prior opinion, that being the opinion cited by 
appellant in this brief, is not in harmony with this 
one, it is set aside. 
The Idaho concept that where money in a joint 
account is deposited by one party and thereafter a 
question of the depositors intent arises, that the 
party ascerting the right to the proceeds must prove 
all of the elements of a gift, excepting irrevocable 
delivery, by clear and convincing evidence is so inter-
woven with the substantial rights of the parties to 
the bank account, that it cannot be separated there-
from without seriously impairing the integrity of 
the cause of action based upon Idaho law. The law 
of the State of Idaho, bx loci, would therefore neces-
sarily be applicable to the issues in this case. 
Appellant, in Point I of his argument, keeps 
ref erring to the issue of constructive trust. While 
plaintiffs did, as part of the relief prayed for in their 
Complaint, seek the declaration of a constructive 
trust over the proceeds obtained from the bank ac-
count by Bessie Monson, they also asked as separate 
relief that they be awarded a money judgment 
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against defendant BEssie l\1onson. The trial Court 
did not impose a const1 uctive trust on the proceeds, 
but instead granted plaintiffs a judment against de-
fendant without imposing a constructive trust. The 
writer fails to see the niateriality of appellants ref-
erences to constructive trust in Point I of his argu-
ment. 
POINT II 
UNDER IDAHO LAW DEFENDANT CLEARLY HAS 
THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD WITH THE EVI-
DENCE AND PROVING ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF A 
GIFT, EXCEPTING IRREVOCABLE DELIVERY, BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
The State of Idaho within recent years has de-
cided two cases bearing on this subject. The first 
case is entitled Idaho First National Bank vs. First 
National Bank of Caldwell and is found at 340 P.2d 
1094 (1959). In this case a man by the name of 
Griffiths, who was by profession an attorney at law, 
created a joint account, naming his nephew, \Valter 
Griffiths Jr., as a joint depositor thereon. Walter 
Griffiths Sr. passed away, and defendant Walter 
Griffiths Jr. claimed he was entitled to the funds 
held in the joint bank account. The administrator 
of the Estate of Walter Griffiths Sr., deceased, 
brought action seeking to recover the funds previ-
ously held in the joint bank account so that they 
might be distributed to the heirs pursuant to the 
probate proceedings which had been initiated. 
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff anrl 
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against the defendant, and defendant appealed to 
the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho. 
Idaho Supreme Court held: 
"Where money in a joint account is de-
posited by one party, and thereafter a ques-
tion of the depositor's intent arises, the party 
asserting the gift must prove all the elements 
of a gift, excepting irrevocable delivery, by 
clear and convincing evidence. The question 
of intent of decedent having been raised, de-
fendants were required to assume the burden 
of proof and to establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence such elements of a gift." 
In a more recent case entitled In Re Chase's 
Estate, found at 348 P.2d 473, (1960) the Idaho 
Supreme Court again had occasion to decide a case 
concerning joint bank accounts and Idaho law per-
taining to presumptions and burdens of proof. In 
Re Chase's Estate concerns a situation in which one 
of two joint depositors claimed to be entitled to funds 
in a joint account following the death of the other 
joint depositor. The Idaho Supreme Court In Re 
Chase's Estate stated: 
"The issue of Mr. Chase's intent in cre-
ating the accounts having been raised, the 
question is whether respondent, by clear and 
convincing evidence, proved a gift to her of 
those bank accounts, completed upon the death 
of decedent. VVith this in mind, we shall re-
view the evidence." 
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POINT III 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CLEARLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Defendant Bessie Monson, although she had the 
burden of proving all of the elements of a gift of 
the bank account, excepting irrevocable delivery, by 
clear and convincing evidence, failed to present any 
evidence at all to prove that James Leon Woodward, 
deceased, made a completed gift to her during his 
lifetime. In fact, evidence clearly shows that she 
did not receive a gift of the funds from James Leon 
Woodward. There were no words of donative intent. 
The only thing Jam es Leon Woodward told her dur-
in his lifetime concerning said account was "Just 
a minute, I have got a card out in the car I have 
been carrying around and have forgot to have you 
sign, I want you to put your signature on it so if 
anything happens to me you can take care of my 
burial expenses." No other conversation took place 
between Bessie Monson, defendant-appellant and de-
ceased Jam es Leon Woodward during his lifetime 
concerning the joint account. ( T-68) James Leon 
Woodward never told Bessie Monson she would be 
entitled to retain the balance after paying burial 
expenses. 
Did James Leon W oodwa.rd assume that Bes-
sie Monson, defendant-appellant would treat her 
brothers and sisters, plaintiffs-respondents fairly 
and distribute the balance of the proceeds evenly 
among all of his sons and daughters fallowing the 
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payment of burial expenses? This we will never 
know. 
James Leon Woodward did not deliver posses-
sion of the bank pass book to Bessie Monson during 
his lifetime. ( T-58, T-68) Bessie Monson made no 
deposits or withdrawals from the bank account dur-
ing the lifetime of James Leon Woodward. ( T-69) 
He never told Bessie Monson that he gave her the 
account or the money in it. (T-69) Bessie Monson 
never considered the funds in the account were hers 
until after the death of James Leon Woodward. 
(T-75) 
Following the death of James Leon Woodward, 
Bessie Monson removed all the papers and documents 
relating to the business transactions of James Leon 
vVoodward and pertaining to the joint savings ac-
count from his personal residence in Preston, Idaho. 
(T-129) Although she had all of the papers relat-
ing to the transaction involving the sale of the farm, 
and well knew that the proceeds from the sale of 
the farm had been placed in 2. joint bank account 
with her, she attempted to conceal the funds from 
her brothers and sisters. She denied to them that 
she knew anything pertaining to the transaction in-
volving the sale of the farm, at a time when she 
not only knew the particulars of the farm transac-
tion but had the papers pertaining to it in her pos-
session. She denied she knew of the existence of 
a bank account in which the proceeds from the sale 
of the farm had been placed at times when she knew 
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the existence of the account, and in fact at times 
after she had withdrawn ele funds and placed them 
in her own account. (T-'10, T-88, T-1C9, T-130, T-
131) If Bessie Monson felt genuinely and hcnestly 
entitled to the funds, why did she feel it necessary 
to lie to her own brothers and sisters and attempt 
to conceal the existence of the joint bank account? 
POINT IV 
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE SUPREl\IE COURT TO RE-
VIEW THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO THE FINDINGS, AND THEY MUST BE ALLOWED TO 
STAND IF REASONABLE MINDS COULD AGREE WITH 
THEM. 
The transcript of testimony in this case, as in 
any case, contains merely the words spoken at trial. 
It cannot contain inflections or tones of the voices 
of the witnesses. The demeanor of the witnesses, 
their apparent candor, or lack thereof, as gained 
from their overall appearance in the Court room, 
unfortunately, cannot be made a part of a transcript 
of testimony. The trial Court sits in a position of 
great advantage in that the trier of fact on the trial 
Court level has the opportunity of observing the de-
meanor and other behavior of the witnesses, has the 
advantage of hearing the inflections and tones of 
the witnesses' voices. Much is conveyed beyond the 
spoken word through voice inflection and other char-
acteristics of a witness. This is especially so where 
witnesses do not possess high degrees of education, 
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and hcwe takEn up lines of work which do not require 
1·egula1· expressicn or comrnunicaticn, such 2s con-
struction type work and the like. Very often the in-
flection and overall characteristics of a witness con-
vey even more than their spoken words. 
The Utah Supreme Court has pronounced its 
duty to review the evidence in the light most favor-
able tc the findings of the trial Court1 and stated 
that thEy must be allowed to stand if reasonable 
minds could agree with them on many occ2.sions. 
Rather than citing all of the cases in which this 
principal has been stated, we will simply refer to 
Lawrence vs. Bamberger Railroad Company found 
at 3 Ut. 2d 247, 282 P.2d 335 wherein the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah states: 
"When the court has made findings and 
entered juclment thereon as was done here, it 
is then our duty to review the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the findings, and 
they must be allowed to stand if reasonable 
minds could agree with them. Likewise every 
1·easonable intendment ought to be indulged 
in favor of the validity and correctness of 
the judgment under review, and it will not 
be disturbed unless the appellant meets his 
burden of affirmatively showing error." 
Appellant has failed to show that there is any 
reason for disturbing the findings of the trial Court 
in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial Court should be af-
firmed, and plaintiffs-respondents should be award-
ed costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK & SCHOENHALS 
By --·------- -- -- -- -- -- ------ ----- -------- --- -----
Robert E. Schoenhals 
903 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents. 
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